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It is common to deﬁ  ne beneﬁ  t eligibility for small business policies by restrictions on 
the ﬁ  rm size. This paper investigates the incentives for a large ﬁ  rm to masquerade as 
many small ﬁ  rms by separately incorporating business segments, focusing on the case 
of the Japanese value-added tax. The paper ﬁ  nds that the masquerading was pervasive 
and took place quickly after the introduction of tax incentives. Tax avoidance caused 
3.4 per cent of the overall revenue drain in 1990, thus reducing horizontal equity, 
but the efﬁ  ciency consequence would not have been severe. This study suggests that 
the masquerading by ﬁ  rms may be commonplace in other settings.
Key words: Tax avoidance; Business group; Value-added tax; Firm size distribution 
JEL Classiﬁ  cations: H32; H25; L22; 
Introduction
There is a host of public policies that favour small over large ﬁ  rms, and it is common to 
deﬁ  ne beneﬁ  t eligibility by restrictions on the number of employees or on alternative 
measures of ﬁ  rm size.1 There are often sound rationales for exempting small ﬁ  rms from 
complying with regulations, including the Americans with Disabilities Act that would 
otherwise impose disproportionate compliance costs on small businesses, and from ﬁ  ling 
a tax return, including that for a value-added tax (VAT) where the costs of administra-
tion does not justify the amount of tax collected from small tax payers. Yet, the tax and 
regulatory systems are rendered complex by the preferential treatment by ﬁ  rm size, giv-
ing rise to a clear concern about policy-induced distortions in ﬁ  rm behaviour. Despite 
the pervasiveness of policy thresholds, to this author's knowledge, the distortions are 
discussed in press but not well documented in the academic literature. There have been 
theoretical studies (Keen and Mintz, 2004; Dixon et al., 2004) and an empirical study 
(Schivardi and Trrini, 2004) focusing on the disincentives for ﬁ  rms to grow beyond the 
beneﬁ  t threshold out of concern for the beneﬁ  t eligibility. Though such behaviour is 
plausible for stand-alone ﬁ  rms, in practice, a ﬁ  rm can have a ﬂ  exible structure that allows 
it to respond in diverse ways without placing restriction on its growth. Just as so-called 
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tariff hopping in the context of foreign direct investment, where a ﬁ  rm creates a subsidiary 
in an importing country with a high tariff to bypass the tax, a large ﬁ  rm may avoid the 
loss of eligibility through a creation of multiple subsidiaries that are legally independ-
ent but have a common ownership and control, subject to legal provisions against such 
strategies.2 Thus, the literature leaves undocumented a variety of behavioural responses 
that are potentially relevant in policy making.
The purpose of this paper is to document the behavioural response caused by a tax 
threshold in the context of the VAT introduced in Japan in 1989. The tax reform was 
an overhaul of the Japanese tax system affecting the economy of the nation, but what 
makes this policy change an attractive natural experiment is the sudden appearance of 
tax incentives and the availability of data that allows us to observe changes made in ﬁ  rm 
structure, a major obstacle in this line of study. This setting allows us to ask questions such 
as: How pervasive was the strategy to split corporations? How quickly did ﬁ  rms respond 
to the new tax incentives? What were the commonly separated business segments, if any? 
In addition, though a study on a VAT threshold is an interest in itself3, it is particularly 
informative to focus on a tax setting, rather than a regulatory setting, since the gains from 
tax avoidance can be estimated reasonably. By understanding the tax gains to ﬁ  rms, we 
learn about the extent of revenue drains caused by tax avoidance, but in addition, we can 
gauge the extent of efﬁ  ciency losses which may result from ﬁ  rms choosing sub-optimal 
organizational structures (for example, Goolsbee and Maydew, 2002). Given that a ra-
tional ﬁ  rm would not incur costs greater than the beneﬁ  ts, the amount of tax beneﬁ  ts is 
the upper bound for the efﬁ  ciency losses. Though the speciﬁ  city of the setting may render 
generalisation difﬁ  cult4, this paper provides a tangible example of behavioural response 
that policy makers can expect from incorporating a threshold in legislation.
To this end, this paper considers two complementary identiﬁ  cation strategies that 
utilise a large sample of Japanese corporate groups. The data used in this paper is Afﬁ  li-
ated Company Data (ACD), an annual survey of publicly-traded companies that collects 
information on their domestic subsidiaries.5 To identify the overall inﬂ  uence of a policy 
threshold, we ﬁ  rst compare the size distribution of businesses in the neighbourhood of the 
threshold before and after the tax change. As there is a concern that confounding inﬂ  uences 
might mask any effects of the tax, we apply the semi-parametric technique developed by 
Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to control for the other changes in the economy. 
Though this approach has an intuitive appeal, it does not allow us to distinguish between 
different hypotheses on behavioural response. To test a hypothesis that the tax threshold 
induced corporations to split up, we next examine new group members founded under 
different tax regimes, since the direct consequence of corporate splitting is the addition 
of new members. Finally, this paper estimates tax beneﬁ  ts in the sample, distinguishing 3
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between windfall gains and tax-avoidance gains, and extrapolates to the population.
Evidence found in this study is consistent with the hypothesis that a policy thresh-
old induces ﬁ  rms to restructure their organisations by splitting some of their member 
corporations. First, using a sample consisting of, on average, 14.8 thousand corporations 
each year, a comparison of the size distribution in 1988 and 1990 shows an increase in 
the density below the size threshold attributable to the tax reform of 1989. Statistical 
tests indicate that the difference is signiﬁ  cant, implying that the tax threshold exerts a 
strong inﬂ  uence. Second, we ﬁ  nd that the tax inﬂ  uenced the founding of 10.7 to 12.7 
per cent of new corporations incorporated over July 1988 through March 1991, a period 
when tax incentives were relatively strong. Further examination shows that much of the 
behavioural response occurred within a year and a half after the implementation of the 
law, suggesting ﬁ  rms are quick in making adjustments to a new tax regime. Interestingly, a 
small annual tax beneﬁ  t, in order of $10,000 to $25,000 per company (in 1990 dollars6), 
is a sufﬁ  cient tax motive, though it is the smaller groups in our sample that responded 
to this level of tax incentives. In conjunction with the result suggesting that it was com-
mon to separate transportation divisions, which would be relatively independent from 
other production processes, the efﬁ  ciency loss caused by tax-motivated restructuring 
would have been modest; the revenue loss due to tax-motivated splitting, which is the 
upper bound for the efﬁ  ciency loss in the economy, is 22 billion yen ($152 million) in 
1990, or 3.4 per cent of the overall revenue drain due to the preferential tax treatment 
of small businesses. Nonetheless, horizontal equity of the Japanese VAT was impaired by 
the incorporation of the threshold.
This paper adds to the literature on tax avoidance by ﬁ  rms and relates to the stud-
ies on the effects of taxes on organisational structures.7 Though tax incentives may be 
apparent to informed observers, including in the case of VAT thresholds8, the relevance 
to ﬁ  rm decisions is a matter of empirical question. Naturally, it is difﬁ  cult to assess the 
pervasiveness of tax avoidance behaviour, and as a result of a lack of documentation, the 
practical importance of tax incentives is sometimes questioned, as in the textbook example 
of a multi-stage turnover tax.9 In theory, this tax creates tax incentives to merge with 
upstream suppliers since the tax is levied at each point that goods change possession, but 
Williamson (1985) suggests that taxes are of minor consideration in vertical mergers.10 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to verify Williamson's suggestion, since our focus is 
not on the boundaries between economically independent units. Rather, this study aims 
to enhance the understanding of the boundaries between distinct legal entities belonging 
to a close-knit group. Thus, this study is relevant to the literature on business groups11, 
and in a broad sense, also relates to Stephens and Ward-Batts (2004) study on income 
shifting between husbands and wives. In light of Khanna and Yafeh (2005) who argue 4
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that the origin of business groups are not well understood, this paper contributes to the 
study of business groups by exploring the role of taxes in the formation of groupings.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the tax scheme to be ex-
ploited as a natural experiment and discusses preliminary evidence. Section 3 considers 
a semi-parametric approach, outlines its implementation, and presents evidence on the 
effects of a tax threshold on corporate size distribution. Section 4 turns to the corporate 
splitting hypothesis and considers a parametric approach. Section 5 estimates the revenue 
drain and presents the result extrapolated to the population. Section 6 concludes.
Tax Incentives
Simpliﬁ  ed Scheme
Against the backdrop of growing government debt and an aging population, a consump-
tion-type VAT known as consumption tax was introduced in April 1989, replacing com-
modity taxes that had narrow bases.12 Overall, the Japanese VAT had a simple structure; 
the tax rate was uniform at 3 per cent and relatively few items were exempted.13 However, 
the treatment of small business was unusually generous by OECD standards, as a result 
of political concessions given by the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to its busi-
ness constituents.14
The special treatment for small businesses included what is known as the simpliﬁ  ed 
ﬁ  ling scheme. A ﬁ  rm usually computes its tax liability by subtracting tax paid on inputs 
from tax collected on sales under the ordinary ﬁ  ling of a VAT. The main burden to a 
taxpayer is in the computation of the tax paid on inputs; the simpliﬁ  ed ﬁ  ling reduces this 
compliance cost by presuming that taxed inputs are 80 per cent of taxable sales, a com-
mon single rate for most industries.15 Tax liability is then simply 0.6 per cent of taxable 
sales, thus converting a VAT into a turnover tax. The eligibility is deﬁ  ned in terms of the 
amount of sales in the base period, which is two years prior to the current tax year, and 
the threshold amount of sales is 500 million yen ($3.3 million) under the 1989 system. 
96.7 per cent of all businesses were eligible in 1989, but they were small businesses that 
only accounted for 19 per cent of total turnover in the economy.16
The main problem with the simpliﬁ  ed scheme is that it generates a hidden subsidy by, in 
essence, giving too much tax credit. Consider the effective tax payment by a seller under 
a x per cent VAT. In addition to the tax liable to the government (x), the seller pays 
tax on its purchase of taxable inputs (c), which include materials as well as capital equip-
ment but does not include wage bills. If this effective tax payment is smaller than the 
tax collected from buyers, a tax beneﬁ  t  Bs c T =- + xx ^ _ hi is generated.  s x  denotes 5
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tax collected on taxable sales. B under ordinary ﬁ  ling is of course zero because the tax 
liability is the difference between the tax collected and tax paid on inputs. Under the 
simpliﬁ  ed scheme, however, businesses with high value-added beneﬁ  t. Denote a ratio of 
value-added to sales by o , so that cs 1 =- o ^h .17 Then under the simpliﬁ  ed scheme,
  , max Bs 0 =- xo o t ^h 7 A          ( 1 )
where o t  is a presumed rate of value-added of 20 per cent. The max function captures the 
legislation allowing low value-added tax payers to opt out from the scheme. A company 
therefore gains from the tax if its actual value-added ratio is greater than 20 per cent. 
Thus, under the simpliﬁ  ed scheme, a hidden subsidy arises from the discrepancy between 
the actual and presumed rate of value added.
It is well recognised that the simpliﬁ  ed scheme compromised the revenue perform-
ance of the VAT through this drainage of tax revenue. Further, the system impaired 
horizontal equity since it did not account for the diversity in value-added ratios across 
industries, as documented below. Subsequent amendments addressed these concerns. In 
October 1991, the presumed rate category was expanded to reﬂ  ect the actual rates to 
improve equity and the threshold was reduced to 400 million yen; in 1997 the threshold 
was lowered to 200 million yen.18
Behavioural Response
Since it is the businesses with sales less than 500 million yen that are eligible for the sim-
pliﬁ  ed scheme, the threshold creates incentives to shift sales to favourably taxed entities 
within a corporate group.19 A variety of tax avoidance strategies is conceivable to achieve 
this end: foregoing sales beyond 500 million yen; falsely attributing sales to small enti-
ties; and transferring high value-added business segment to small group members. This 
paper focuses on a strategy involving splitting a corporation, and this section considers 
the beneﬁ  ts and costs of such strategy.
Figure 1 shows levels of B for a company with a value-added ratio of 35 per cent, 
which is approximately the average for the manufacturing sector in 1989.20 Tax beneﬁ  t 
is increasing in sales up to the threshold level, peaking at 2.3 million yen ($15,000) per 
annum. Two kink points for small sales arise from other preferential schemes for very 
small businesses; exemption and phasing out of exemption. Notice that unlike the per-
sonal exemption under a typical individual income tax, where the tax liability is based 
on the portion of income exceeding the exempted amount, because the sales determine 
the beneﬁ  t eligibility in our context, there is a sharp discontinuity at the threshold level 
of sales. Further, a tax beneﬁ  t from a single split can be greater than 2.3 million yen. 
There is an anecdotal case where a producer of TV advertisements was divided into four 6
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separate entities.21 Likewise, successfully dividing in half a company with 1 billion yen in 
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Figure 1: The illustration of tax incentives under the 1989 VAT
Table 1 illustrates tax incentives by industry under the tax regime of 1989 and of 
1991. The average value-added ratios for each industry are shown in the ﬁ  rst column 
and the presumed rates under the 1989 and 1991 regime are shown in the second and 
third column respectively. Since the value added is diverse across industries but the pre-
sumed value added does not vary very much in 1989, the tax beneﬁ  ts vary as shown in 
the fourth column. For example, the tax beneﬁ  t to a real estate company with sales of 
500 million is 3.8 million yen per year, which is 18 times as much as that of a retail com-
pany. Nonetheless, People's Finance Corporation (1994) reports a case involving a retail 
company, indicating a possible within-industry variation.22 The amendment in October 
1991 adjusted presumed rates, so that the degree of diversity and the level of incentives 
were reduced, as shown in the last column.
There is a complication in assessing the tax beneﬁ  t since it is taxable under corporate 
income tax. The effective rate was 49.98 per cent in 198923 but it is difﬁ  cult to know 
how much is in fact recaptured by the authority in practice, since 48 per cent of corpora-
tions reported tax losses in 1990 and income may be hidden through other avoidance 
strategies. Furthermore, there is a favourable tax consequence in creating small corpora-
tions (for example, higher deductibility of entertainment expenses and a lower tax rate 
for income below 8 million yen). Thus, the tax beneﬁ  t may be reduced by an income tax 
but not to its full extent.7
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In theory, the decision to split a corporation depends also on the costs involved 
in organising a business in a way a ﬁ  rm would not have chosen in the absence of the tax 
incentives: Goolsbee and Maydew (2002) suggest the principle-agent cost might be ag-
gravated; it may be administratively inconvenient to maintain separate legal entities; by 
founding a new corporation, a ﬁ  rm incurs administrative as well as registration costs.24 
The effect of the threshold in inducing corporate splitting was a concern to the policy 
makers, and therefore, the tax code contains provisions against this tax avoidance strategy. 
However, the effectiveness of these provisions is questionable. There was no provision 
for splitting involving sole proprietors, and even the law on corporations was not tight. 
A divested corporation is not recognised to be a separate entity from its parent for the 
purpose of the VAT, depending on the method of ﬁ  nancing the paid-in capital, the 
ownership of the stocks, and the activity of the divested company.25 There is sufﬁ  cient 
room to adjust the legal transaction that a ﬁ  rm can easily avoid being consolidated.26 
Therefore the legal deterrence seems sufﬁ  ciently weak and whether the costs outweigh 
the tax beneﬁ  ts is an empirical question.
Preliminary Evidence
In addition to the anecdotes mentioned above, there is a case in our dataset indicating the 
relevance of the simpliﬁ  ed scheme on a ﬁ  rm's reorganisation decision.27 The case involves 
a corporate group headed by S-Line Co. which is a closely-integrated owner-managed 
trucking group; the owner was the company representative in all of its 41 subsidiaries 
in 1991.28 The group conducted the following reorganisation. In November 1988, just 
as the VAT bill was passing the Lower House, the group founded a subsidiary, Central 
Table 1: Industry variation in tax incentives 
  Value-added ratio (%)  Tax beneﬁ  tsb (mil. Yen)  
 Estimatea Presumed  rate  B1989  B1990
Industry        v   1989        1991       
Wholesale 14.8  10  10  0.72  0.72
Retail 21.4  20  20  0.21  0.21
Construction 23.1  20  30  0.465  0
Mining 29  20  30  1.35  0
Agricultural, Forestry, 
and Fisheries  31  20  30  1.65  0.15
Manufacturing 33.4  20  30  2.01  0.51
Services 39.3  20  40  2.895  0
Transportation and 
Telecommunications 45.2 20  40  3.78  0.78
Real Estate  45.6  20  40  3.84  0.84
Notes: a. Industry average reported in the Ministry of Finance (1990) as reproduced in Ishi (2001, p293)
b. Tax beneﬁ  ts (B) is computed as in the text, assuming s=500 million yen, x=0.038
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Japan Operation Services (CJOS).29 CJOS shared with Delivery911, Ichimiya (DI), 
another group member, the company representative, telephone number and address. 
Most interestingly, the sum of their sales at the end of FY1988 was 529 million yen, 
meaning DI would have crossed the threshold level of sales by just 29 million yen in the 
absence of the reorganisation, assuming CJOS was a business segment of DI prior to 
the reorganisation.30 In addition, well before the formulation of the 1991 amendment, 
Three S Transportation (TST) was founded in October 1990. After the tax incentives 
were reduced, TST merged with DI in 1994. Tax beneﬁ  t accruing to three corporations 
is estimated to be 14 million yen ($93,000) over 1989-1991. Thus, S-Line Group's 
behaviour is consistent with the tax avoidance explanation. In particular, it seems fair 
to suggest that the motive in establishing CJOS was tax planning aiming to prevent DI 
from stepping over the threshold.
The anecdotes show the relevance of tax incentives, but they do not reveal the 
prevalence of tax avoidance. To see how widespread this strategy was, we ﬁ  rst examine 
the number of commercial registration of new corporations. Figure 2 shows a plot by 
calendar year. There is a surge of new registrations from 1988 through 1991.31 This pat-
tern supports the hypothesis of tax-motivated splitting since the reform would have been 
anticipated from June/July 1988, well before the implementation of April 1989.32 Though 
there is an alternative explanation based on the operation of Japan’s bubble economy. 
The surge of founding can also be explained by the high level of domestic investment 
Figure 2: Commercial registrations (founding) by type of organization9
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spurred by loose monetary policy and the rapid appreciation of the yen.33 Next, we turn 
to corporation-level data to distinguish these explanations.
Semi-parametric approach
A natural way to identify the overall inﬂ  uence of a policy threshold is to examine the size 
distribution of businesses in the neighbourhood of the threshold. This paper implements 
kernel density estimation and makes a comparison of distributions in 1988 and 1990. 
There are two main issues in implementation. First, sales distributions may change over 
time for reasons unrelated to the tax structure, for example, due to changes in underlying 
corporate attributes, such as sectoral composition. Since such inﬂ  uences can mask the 
effects of tax incentives and bias our inference, it is necessary to decompose the change 
in distribution into that caused by the tax change, and that due to attribute changes. 
For the purposes of this decomposition, this study applies the technique developed by 
Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996, hereafter denoted as DFL), which is widely applied 
in the study of wage distributions.
Second, the choice of bandwidth is a general issue in kernel density estimation (Pagan 
and Ullah, 1999), and there is a speciﬁ  c consideration for our purpose: Kernel density 
estimation can mask any discontinuity in underlying data by over-smoothing, resulting 
in under-identiﬁ  cation of threshold effects. This is because in evaluating a density  fy ^h  
at point y, the estimation process uses information at and around y with progressively 
less weight being placed on distant observations. For example, the estimate of a density 
at a point immediately below the threshold sales incorporates information from points 
above the threshold. Since the rule of thumb used in the literature, such as selecting a 
bandwidth to minimise Mean Integrated Squared Error, does not suit our purpose, we 
instead present the results for a range of bandwidths.
Data
The data used in this study is from Afﬁ  liated Company Data (ACD), which contains infor-
mation on publicly-traded parents and their child corporations. The sample of corporations 
in this data is not representative of the whole population of Japanese corporations in two 
respects. First, the sample consists of relatively large corporations, since ACD is based on 
a survey of publicly-traded parents. Table 2 presents the distribution of corporate size in 
terms of paid-in capital. The distribution is heavily skewed to the left for the population. 
In 1988, nearly 80 per cent of corporations were in the smallest size category, but the 
sample is relatively dense on the right and contains fewer than 10 per cent in the same 
category. Second, the corporations in the sample are members of corporate groups, but 10
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most corporations in the population are independent. According to the 2001 Establish-
ment and Enterprise Census (EEC) conducted by the Statistics Bureau, Japan, just 4.8 
per cent of all corporations are afﬁ  liated with another company.34
Table 2: The number of corporations by the size of paid-in capital
         Size Categories (paid-in capital, million yen)
Year  Data  All sizes  (0, 10]  [10, 100)  100, 1,000)  [1,000, )
1988  Population  1,980,540   1,583,805   376,205   17,442   3,088 
         (79.97)  (19.00)  (0.88)  (0.16)
1988  Sample  13,760   1,316   6,833   3,439   2,172 
         (9.56)  (49.66)  (24.99)  (15.78)
1990  Population  2,020,455   1,590,035   406,618   19,997   3,805 
         (78.70)  (20.13)  (0.99)  (0.19)
1990  Sample  15,901   1,420   8,081   3,863   2,537 
         (8.93)  (50.82)  (24.29)  (15.95)
Notes: Number of corporations. Percentage of all sizes are in parentheses. The population ﬁ  gures are based 
on the estimates by the Ministry of Finance, Financial Statement Data. The sample ﬁ  gures are based on this 
author's calculation using the samples.
These two types of discrepancies complicate the extrapolation of this study to the 
population. Since the tax threshold affects small-to-medium size corporations directly, 
stronger responses are expected from those groups. Thus, in this respect, the results based 
on this sample, which contains a small fraction of small companies, may understate the 
true impact on the population. However, afﬁ  liates may respond more ﬂ  exibly to the law 
than independent corporations do; the transaction costs of sales shifting among sibling 
corporations would be low, but it may be prohibitively high for an independent corpora-
tion. Therefore, it is possible for the result based on this sample to overstate any impact 
on the population. The net effects of these types of bias are not clear, but the behaviour 
of corporate groups is of interest in itself: the afﬁ  liates of corporate groups account for 
a signiﬁ  cant portion of the national economy. According to the 2001 EEC, corporate 
groups accounted for 43.9 per cent of private-sector employment.
This study uses samples of corporations from before and after the VAT introduction 
in 1989. The sample before the tax change is the 1990 ACD, which contains information 
from FY1988. Likewise, the post-introduction sample is the 1992 ACD, which contains 
FY1990 data. The tax change was expected during FY198835, therefore corporations would 
have had time to respond to the expected change in tax law. The FY1988 sample may 
capture pre-introduction responses, but the earlier sample is not available. The sample is 
restricted to observations that contain required variables and existed for at least one year 
prior to the beginning of the ﬁ  scal year. There are overlapping observations in the raw 
data set due to the survey process. Those overlapped observations are removed from the 11
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sample, unless they are the head of another group, or a subsidiary of a head reported as 
a subsidiary in another group. The summary statistics are presented in Table 3.36
Table 3: Summary statistics of the 1988 and 1990 sample
Variable 1988  1990    all
ln (amount of sales)  7.835  7.844  7.840
 (7.636)  (7.665)  (7.650)
Age [months]  280.3   278.0   279.1 
 (230.0)  (229.0)  (230.0)
ln (amount of paid-in capital)  4.514   4.517   4.516 
 (3.912023)  (3.912)  (3.912)
ln (number of workers)  4.341   4.243   4.289 
 (4.263)  (4.143)  (4.190)
Number of group members  31.1   33.8   32.5 
 (17.0)  (18.0)  (18.0)
Voting shares held in group [%]  62.4   63.3   62.9 
 (70.0)  (71.9)  (70.0)
Indicator
Publicly traded  0.139   0.133   0.136
Shares the same address as parenta  0.259   0.274   0.267
Sales at or less than 500 million  0.224   0.223   0.223 
Wholesales  0.118   0.120   0.119
Retail 0.076    0.076    0.076 
Construction and Mining  0.062   0.065   0.063 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery  0.005   0.004   0.005
Manufacturing  0.360   0.356   0.358 
Service  0.116   0.166   0.143
Transportation and Communication  0.089   0.091   0.090 
Financial and Real Estate  0.089   0.096   0.093
Others 0.084    0.025    0.053
Observations 13,760  15,901  29,661
Notes: The ﬁ  gures are sample averages for continuous variables and proportions for dummy variables. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. a. Parent companies are excluded in computation
Methodology
Notations and Assumptions
This section describes the application of the DFL decomposition technique in our 
study, following Chiquiar and Hanson (2002). y is a natural logarithm of sales 
(in million yen),  , ,..., x xx x n 12 = ",  is a vector of n company attributes and t is a 
time period. Each observation is thought of as a vector  ,x y ^h  that belongs to a 
joint distribution  ,x Fy t _i  at a given point in time. The probability density func-
tion for this joint distribution is denoted as  ,x fy t _i . Note that the shape of a joint 
density at time t can depend on institutional factors, including a tax threshold. 
The conditional density function of y on x can be written as,12
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  ,, / xx x gy t fy t l t = _ _ _ i i i        (2)
where  x lt _i  is the marginal density of x at time t. By rearranging the expression 
and taking the integral over the domain of x, which is denoted as  x X  , we obtain




__ _ _ ii i i ##      ( 3 )
  The middle expression of (density of y) is the marginal density of y at time t since 
the marginal density of y can be obtained by integrating over x , given that y and x have 
a joint density (Golberg, 1984).
Equation (density of y) shows that changes in the density of y can occur through 
changes in the shape of the conditional density  . g^h and through the distribution of x. 
If the threshold causes clustering of corporations at  n y 15 0 0 = ^h , then
    n, > n, xx gy t gy t 1 500 1990 1 500 1988 == == __ ii      (4)
for some representative level of x. In addition, if the threshold affects density around 
n y 15 0 0 = ^h , the effects are captured by the difference between  , x gy t 1990 = t _i  and     
, x gy t 1988 = t _i , where y t represents a value of y in the neighbourhood of 500 million. 
On the other hand, if the density of y changes due to changes in sectoral composition, for 
example, such an effect causes the distribution of x to change. This effect is represented 
by the difference between  x lt1990 = _i  and  x lt1988 = _i .
The following expression is the counterfactual density that would have prevailed 
in 1990, had the distribution of company characteristics remained as it was in 1988.




_ _ i i #        ( 5 )
To make the substitution for the density of x in this expression, it is assumed that 
the distribution of attributes and the conditional distribution are independent of one 
another. Speciﬁ  cally, it is presumed that the tax change, which is thought to affect the 
conditional distribution, does not affect the distribution of attributes. In addition, the as-
sumption means that the distribution of attributes will not affect sales conditional on x .37
If there was an increase in the number of companies in a particular industry, for example, 
this assumption requires that the goods demanded in the industry increase accordingly, 
so that companies are not constrained to sell less.
The economy grew robustly by 10.7 per cent over 1988 to 1990 and the price 
level, in terms of the GDP deﬂ  ator, increased by 4.8 per cent. These changes are likely to 13
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affect the overall shape of the distribution, including the mean and the spread, but since 
the analysis on threshold effects is unlikely to be affected, the macroeconomic changes 
are ignored in this section.
Hypothetical density
To make the counterfactual density estimable, it is re-expressed as follows.
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where  / xx lt lt 1988 1990 / == i __ ii . Note that the counterfactual density is equiva-
lent to the 1990 density, except for the weighting function i . As shown in previous 
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Using the combined sample of FY1988 and FY1990 data,  x Pt 1988 = _i  is estimated 
parametrically by running a probit on the observation belonging to the 1988 sample. 
Independent variables in the regression are age, age squared, the natural logarithm of 
paid-in capital (in million yen), the natural logarithm of number of workers, an indicator 
for public companies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies. It is necessary for 
the distribution of these independent variables to be unaffected by the VAT threshold; 
otherwise, the threshold effects would be biased down as changes in these variables capture 
the impact of the VAT threshold. As a robustness check, paid-in capital and workers were 
removed from the regression, but results were not sensitive. In addition, the company 
age variable may be a concern since the number of young companies would increase due 
to tax-motivated splitting, but since newly created companies are but a small fraction of 
the overall sample, they are generally unlikely to affect the age distribution.
The rest of the terms in the weighting function (weight) are computed as follows:       
xx Pt Pt 1990 1 1988 == - = ^^ hh , Pt 1990 = ^h  and Pt 1988 = ^h  are the propor-
tions of the 1990 and 1988 observations, respectively.14
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Kernel density estimation
The counterfactual density is estimated by the Rosenblatt-Pazen kernel density estima-
tor,








== = - i i
! = X
t t
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where  ... in 1 =  are observations from the FY1990 sample. i t is the estimated weight based 
on (weight),  . K^h is the Epanechnikov kernel density function and h is the bandwidth. 
The Epanechnikov kernel function has the convenient property of being truncated at 
points, providing us with information on the range of support involved in estimating a 
density at each point. As discussed, the choice of bandwidth is an issue. Here, the results 
are presented for different levels of bandwidth (0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.08, 0.06, 0.04, 0.02). 




- _i  is 0.33 and 0.35 
for the 1988 and 1990 sample respectively. Note that the optimal bandwidth differs by 
samples, as it depends on the sample size  n ^h  and standard deviation  v ^h . Thus, for a valid 
comparison, it may be preferable to vary the bandwidth by varying the per cent reduction 
from the optimal bandwidth rather than using different levels of common bandwidth. 
This alternative method was implemented but the results were generally not sensitive to 
the change. The benchmark result to be discussed below uses the common bandwidth of 
0.08. With the Epanechnikov function, this bandwidth implies that the information on 
companies from 418 to 598 million yen is used to estimate the density at  n 15 0 0 .
Results
Benchmark Result
Figure 3 presents the results for the medium bandwidth of 0.08. It shows the kernel 
density estimates of the natural log of sales for the samples in FY1988 and FY1990 along 
with the counterfactual. The vertical line indicates the threshold level of sales, which is 
the natural log of 500. A visual inspection of the actual densities suggests that around 
the threshold level of sales, the density is thicker for the post-change density, whereas for 
greater amount of sales, the pattern reverses. Figure 4 presents, in a solid line, the differ-
ences in the actual densities by sales level.  At the threshold point, there is a 12.4 per cent 
increase in the actual density, and the greatest change near the threshold occurs at the 
sales level of 475 million yen, where the density increases by 15.5 per cent. In contrast, 
the density declines over the range [570, 990], which peaks at 845. Taken at face value, 
this shows that there was a movement of mass from sizes above the threshold to below 15
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the threshold. Further, Figure 4 shows that the 1990 density is generally increasing over 
the range, but there is a slight decrease beyond the threshold point, revealing a clustering 
of companies just below the threshold. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis 
of the institutional effects on the size distribution.
The broad pattern is robust to controlling for the changes in company attributes. 
The line corresponding to  ∆  Attributes is the actual FY1990 minus the counterfactual; 
the line corresponding to  ∆  Institution is the counterfactual minus the actual FY1988. 
In the neighbourhood of the threshold, the estimated changes due to the institution are 16
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very close to the actual changes, showing that the change in the attributes did not cause 
the shift. For example, 95 per cent of the change at the threshold point is attributable 
to institutional effects.
One notable difference is that the reduction in the mass beyond the threshold point 
becomes pronounced. The decline occurs in the range [560, 1,080], which is wider than 
in the ﬁ  nding without the control. This suggests that the effects of the threshold in this 
range were stronger than the comparison of actual densities would suggest. It makes 
economic sense to ﬁ  nd strong effects in this range. If a corporation with 1 billion yen in 
sales is divided into two, the entire amount of sales can be shifted into the preferred status. 
In contrast, if the tax status of divesting corporations does not change, the maximum 
amount of sales that can be shifted is at most 500 million yen per splitting. Since tax 
beneﬁ  ts per splitting are greater for corporations in the range [500, 1,000], the decline 
in the densities that cover most of this range is highly revealing of the threshold effects. 
Overall, the results show a pattern consistent with the inﬂ  uence of the tax threshold on 
the sales distribution around the threshold.
Figure 5: The estimates of institutional effects by selected bandwidth
Sensitivity to bandwidth
Figure 5 presents a comparison of density decompositions by the maximum, median, and 
minimum bandwidth. The ﬂ  attest line corresponds to the maximum bandwidth (0.3). 
Threshold effects are not detectable with this level of bandwidth, which is not surprising 
since the range of support involved in evaluating the density at 500 million yen is over 
255 to 977 million yen, thereby averaging out any effects caused by the threshold. The 
minimum bandwidth (0.02) yields a noisy pattern, with a substantial increase in density 17
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at a point slightly below the threshold point. Since the effects of the threshold, if there 
are any, would become visible with narrower bandwidths, this pattern is consistent with 
what we would expect had there been threshold effects.
To provide a reference for statistical signiﬁ  cance, Table 4 presents statistical tests 
commonly used to compare distributions (Burkhauser et al. 1999): the two-sample 
test of differences in proportion and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Using a one-sided 
two-sample test, we test if the null hypothesis of no difference in the proportion over 
the range [400, 500] is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of the propor-
tion being higher in the counterfactual distribution. Likewise, we test if the proportion 
in the range [500, 1000] declined across time. The proportion of corporations in these 
ranges is obtained by integrating the kernel density estimates for both the counterfactual 
distribution and the actual 1988 distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to 
examine the null hypothesis that cumulative distributions, conditional on sales being in 
the range [400, 1000], are not different over time. The conditional distributions are 
derived from the cumulative distribution function estimated for the whole range of sup-
port. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics reported in the table are computed as in 
Stephens (1970).
The general pattern presented in Table 4 conﬁ  rms the prediction that the thresh-
old effects are identiﬁ  able for a sufﬁ  ciently low degree of smoothing. For example, at 
the bandwidth of 0.08, the proportion in [400, 500] is higher under the counterfactual 
distribution by 30.4 basis points, or by 8.7 per cent, and the difference is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant at the 10 per cent level. With narrower bandwidths, the null is rejected with a 
stronger conﬁ  dence. Similarly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates a signiﬁ  cant dif-
ference in distributions once the bandwidth passes 0.04.
Reliability check
As a reliability check, we applied the same tests in comparing distributions over years 
where there is no institutional discontinuity. To the extent that the observed differences 
are caused by noise rather than by the tax change, the tests should reject the null for nar-
row bandwidths even when there is no change in tax incentives. To ensure that there are 
no threshold effects, the data used is from a decade later (FY1998 and FY2000). There is 
neither a threshold at 500 million yen nor a change in the tax threshold in the intervening 
year. There still is a threshold at 200 million yen but the tests focuses on the distribution 
above 400 million yen. Table 5 presents the results. For any level of bandwidths, the tests 
do not reject the null. Thus, this renders support to our interpretation that the difference 
in the 1988 and 1990 distribution is caused by the tax change.
We checked whether the pattern of shift is stronger in the industries with stronger tax 18
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incentives by repeating the analysis on samples split by the level of value-added. We used 
an estimate by the Ministry of Finance of value-added at 1-digit SIC to split the sample 
into two. A visual inspection did not suggest any stronger response in high value-added 
industries. This is the opposite of our conjecture, but this may be reﬂ  ecting higher costs 
of splitting businesses in high value-added industry.
Overall, we ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant impact of threshold effects on corporate size distribution, 
but it is not possible to tell from this approach what types of behaviour were responsible 
for causing the shift. The next section turns to this question and examines the hypothesis 
that corporations were split to gain tax advantage.
Table 4: Two tests on a change in distribution: 1998-1990
I. Two sample test
Bandwidth  Proportion over the relevant range    Difference (%)
    Counter factual 1990    Actual 1988
    [1]  [2]   [1] - [2] 
A. Hypothesis: The density increased over [400, 500] range
 0.3  0.0353  0.0354  -0.36
 0.2  0.0360  0.0354  1.74
 0.1  0.0377  0.0351  7.44
 0.08  0.0380  0.0350  8.70*
 0.06  0.0384  0.0349  9.94*
 0.04  0.0387  0.0350  10.65**
 0.02  0.0392  0.0350  11.97**
B. Hypothesis: The density fell over [500, 1,000] range
 0.3  0.1242  0.1278  -2.87
 0.2  0.1248  0.1293  -3.52
 0.1  0.1243  0.1304  -4.63*
 0.08  0.1241  0.1306  -4.98**
 0.06  0.1239  0.1308  -5.27**
 0.04  0.1238  0.1309  -5.42**
 0.02  0.1236  0.1307  -5.41**
II. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the difference in the cumulative distributions over [400, 
1,000] range
Bandwidth Modiﬁ  ed Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics 
 0.3  0.192       
 0.2  0.499       
 0.1  1.012       
 0.08  1.111       
 0.06  1.193       
 0.04  1.276*       
 0.02  1.413*       
Notes: ** and * denote signiﬁ  cance at 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.19
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Parametric approach
Unlike the information on mergers between large corporations, to my knowledge, cor-
porate splitting is not something that is well recorded in Japan or elsewhere, making it a 
difﬁ  cult type of behaviour on which to conduct a large-scale analysis. Our approach utilises 
data on corporate groups to overcome this difﬁ  culty. A direct consequence of corporate 
splitting is an addition of a new member company to a group. In particular, if the tax law 
that beneﬁ  ts businesses with sales sizes below 500 million yen has an inﬂ  uence on ﬁ  rm 
decisions, the creation rate of new members with such an attribute increases.
Table 5: Two tests on a change in distribution: 1998-2000
I. Two sample test
Bandwidth  Proportion over the relevant range    Difference (%) 
  Counter factual 2000  Actual 1998  
  [1]  [2]   [1] - [2]
A. Hypothesis: The density increased over [400, 500] range       
 0.3  0.0402  0.0413  -2.83 
 0.2  0.0410  0.0420  -2.57 
 0.1  0.0416  0.0430  -3.13 
 0.08  0.0418  0.0431  -2.91 
 0.06  0.0420  0.0431  -2.45 
 0.04  0.0423  0.0433  -2.50 
 0.02  0.0424  0.0437  -2.91 
B. Hypothesis: The density fell over [500, 1,000] range
 0.3  0.1348  0.1343  0.35 
 0.2  0.1359  0.1355  0.30 
 0.1  0.1363  0.1362  0.02 
 0.08  0.1363  0.1364  -0.08 
 0.06  0.1363  0.1366  -0.21 
 0.04  0.1363  0.1365  -0.20 
 0.02  0.1365  0.1363  0.12 
II. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the difference in the cumulative distributions over [400, 
1,000] range
Bandwidth Modiﬁ  ed Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics 
 0.3  0.286       
 0.2  0.325       
 0.1  0.314       
 0.08  0.348       
 0.06  0.370       
 0.04  0.412     
 .02  0.535     
Notes: **, * denote signiﬁ  cance at 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.   20
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To test this hypothesis, we examine the relative propensity of founding small cor-
porations and large corporations from 1985 through 1998. We focus on the relative 
propensity, rather than the raw number of small business founding, since creations of 
new corporations are affected by business conditions. To the extent that there is no dif-
ference in the changes in creation rates across corporate sizes, the business cycle effects 
are removed by examining the difference between the founding pattern of small and large 
corporations. As a validity check of this assumption, we consider a difference-in-difference 
approach and compare sub-samples based on the degree of incentives as discussed below. 
The choice of time period has an advantage in allowing us to study the variation in the 
tax system in a single regression setting, rather than multiple before-after comparisons 
for each policy change.
One complication arises from the fact that the variable deﬁ  ning the beneﬁ  t eligibil-
ity is not determined concurrently with the decision to avoid tax. In implementing this 
approach, we use the sales data generated subsequent to corporate creations. Unlike the 
amount of paid-in capital over which corporate decision makers would have full control, 
the level of sales is inﬂ  uenced by the business climate after creation and the changes in 
corporate decision induced by revisions in tax law, in addition to the original intent of 
decision makers. For example, the 1989 tax change creates an incentive to re-optimise the 
size of subsidiaries founded before 1989 by dividing an organisation further, or by shift-
ing some operations back to the parent.38 If such reactions were widespread, the sample 
from this period would resemble post-introduction observations. Thus the structure of 
the data would bias the estimate of the effect in the 1989 regime downward. We account 
for the business cycle inﬂ  uence by include explicit controls.
The data set consists of 7,619 subsidiaries founded by 1,842 parent companies from 
January 1985 through December 1998. As discussed, the level of sales is observed after 
the founding of a new corporation, and the data is constructed from the seven surveys 
of ACD that are available for every other year from 1989 to 2001. The information on 
new subsidiaries is based on ACD surveys conducted three to ﬁ  ve years after the year of 
founding. In each survey, corporations are asked to report ﬁ  scal information from the 
nearest-ending ﬁ  scal year, so that ﬁ  nancial variables are from corporate ﬁ  scal year starting 
two to four years after the founding. For instance, to construct data on new subsidiaries 
founded from January 1985 through December 1986, the survey conducted in October 
1989 is used, and this survey contains information mainly from FY1988. In selecting the 
survey to extract information from, we are constrained by data availability. In addition, 
observations closer to the survey date tend to contain more missing information.39 In 
sum, the data has time dimensions but is essentially a cross-section data.
Table 6 presents the summary statistics by four tax regimes. Overall, 48.3 per 21
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cent of subsidiaries have sales of less than 500 million after being in existence for, on 
average, 3.2 years, indicating new subsidiaries start off being small in general. The 
pattern of change in proportion is consistent with the tax avoidance hypothesis. The 
proportion of small businesses increases by 6.7 percentage points after the introduc-
tion of VAT, which is statistically signiﬁ  cant. With the two amendments that reduce 
incentives, the proportion falls by 4.3 and 4.7 percentage points. While suggestive, 
this pattern may be caused by other inﬂ  uences in the economy. For example, the pro-
portion of manufacturing subsidiaries, which are likely to have a larger optimal scale 
than those in the service sector, increases ﬁ  rst and declines subsequently. To control 
for the changes in observables, we ﬁ  t a binary response model of the following form.
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The dependent variable yi indicates whether subsidiary i is a small company with 
sales less than 500 million yen.  : U]g  is a normal cumulative density function so we will 
be estimating the probit model.40
Rti is an indicator for subsidiary i being founded during t
th tax regime. Its coefﬁ  cient 
indicates whether the propensity to found small corporations is different from the base 
period. The sample period is divided into seven tax regimes on the basis of the imple-
mentations of the changes (April 1989, October 1991, April 1997) and the expectations 
of the changes (July 1988, April 1991, April 1994). The base period is the time before 
July 1988. The timing for the expectation is chosen to satisfy two criteria; details of the 
relevant amendments had become public knowledge, and the timing of changes had been 
anticipated. We used newspaper articles in the major ﬁ  nancial newspaper, Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, to identify these dates.41
  Xi  is a vector of individual subsidiary characteristics.   AGE   is the number of 
months from the founding until the end of the ﬁ  scal year in which ﬁ  nancial variables are 
generated. Two-digit industry dummies and region dummies, which indicate the location 
of the head ofﬁ  ce, are included to control for compositional changes. A measure of par-
ent size ( PSIZE  ) is the inverse of the natural logarithm of paid-in capital of the parent 
company. Dummies for parent industries are also included. Seasonality was observed in 
the overall pattern of founding, so dummies variables for the founding month (INCMO  
) are included. Sales size of companies would be affected by the economic climate in 
which they operated, thus an industry-speciﬁ  c growth rate of value-added from the time 
of founding until the end of the ﬁ  scal year ( GROWTH  ) is included. Price levels at 
the time of observation affect sales in nominal terms, and the statutory threshold does 
not adjust for nominal changes.42 GDP deﬂ  ators by industry ( PRICE  ) are included 
to control for this inﬂ  uence.22
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Results
The ﬁ  rst two columns in Table 7 present the estimated model with and without the re-
gime dummies. The standard error is corrected for hetero-skedasticity and for clustering 
at the group level. The regime dummies are jointly signiﬁ  cant at 1 per cent, indicating 
that there is a substantial variation in the propensity to found small corporations that is 
not explained by the changes in control variables. In addition, a test indicates that the 
regime dummies do not impose a superﬁ  cial structure to the data.43 The coefﬁ  cients of 
control variables have the expected signs except for the price level but its coefﬁ  cient is 
insigniﬁ  cant. The model ﬁ  t seems sensible; the model predicts correctly 73 per cent of 
the time and MacFadden's likelihood ratio index is 0.018.
Panel A of Figure 6 presents the marginal effects of regime dummies and their 
Table 6: Summary statistics of the sample of new group corporations
Variable   All regimes      Sub-regimes
    Pre. intro.  Reform  Amendment 1  Amendment 2
 85.1-98.12  85.1-89.3  89.4-91.9  91.10-97.3  97.4-98.12
Y 0.483  0.463  0.531  0.488  0.441
Indicator: SALES 500           
AGE 37.9  38.3  39.6  37  36.3
Age as at FYend [month]  (7.0)  (7.2)  (6.7)  (6.9)  (6.7)
PSIZE 0.108  0.108  0.108  0.109  0.109
[ln(log parent's capital)]-¹ (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.020)
GROWTH 0.111  0.195  0.121  0.058  0.011
∆industry GDP [%]  (0.152)  (0.174)  (0.121)  (0.113)  (0.101)
PRICE 109.9  106  111  112.4  111.9
Ind.GDP deﬂ  ator  (20.400)  (13.100)  (20.400)  (23.300)  (25.700)
Incentieve measure  0.068  0.073  0.066  0.067  0.06
v - vhat (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.063)
SALES 3,085  2,682  2,383  3,426  4,476
Business turnover [¥mil.]  (25456)  (13332)  (12181)  (34101)  (36274)
HOLDING 79.9  76.1  76.7  83  87.2
Voting stock held [%]  (29.6)  (32.3)  (31.8)  (26.8)  (21.9)
Industry dummies          
Wholesales 0.114  0.099  0.115  0.122  0.131
Retail 0.088  0.084  0.082  0.085  0.117
Constr. & Mining  0.053  0.055  0.043  0.052  0.071
Agri., Forestry, Fishery  0.006  0.008  0.007  0.004  0.004
Manufacturing 0.211  0.215  0.223  0.211  0.178
Service 0.287  0.263  0.298  0.288  0.336
Transp. & Comm.  0.069  0.069  0.057  0.073  0.077
FIRE 0.115  0.115  0.129  0.122  0.062
Other Industries  0.058  0.091  0.046  0.043  0.023
N 7,619  2,512  1,557  2,696  854
Notes: The ﬁ  gures are sample averages for continuous variables, and proportions for dummy variables. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. The statistics on PSIZE are based on 7,530 observations. Public 
utilities and unclassiﬁ  ed observations are included in "Other Industries". The sample is divided into four 
time periods with these three milestones serving as boundaries; the VAT introduction (1989.4), the ﬁ  rst 
amendment (1991.10), and the second amendment (1997.4)23
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conﬁ  dence intervals.44 The propensity to found a small company increases after the an-
nouncement of the tax change in June 1988, reaches a peak during the second regime 
when the VAT was introduced, and declines subsequently. The coefﬁ  cient of the second 
regime, which is just after the tax reform, is positive and signiﬁ  cant. A new company 
founded in this period is 7.3 per cent more likely to be a small company than those in the 
base period. The estimates imply that 10.7 per cent of new corporations founded over 
Table 7: Examination of the propensity to found small corportations: Probit estimates
  [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]
Tax regimes dummies
1. Expect the '89 reform    0.054  0.053  0.068  0.068
  [1988 Jul. ~ 1989 Mar.]    (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.080)
2. Reform Implemented    0.183***  -0.614*  0.228***  -0.070
  [1989 Apr. ~ 1991 Mar.]    (0.065)  (0.324)  (0.074)  (0.354)
3. Expect the `91 amendment    0.094  0.093  0.151  0.150
  [1991 Apr. ~ 1991 Sep.]    (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.108)  (0.108)
4. `91 amendment implemented    0.0611  0.060  0.086  0.086
  [1991 Oct. ~ 1994 Mar.]    (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.078)  (0.078)
5. Expect the '97 amendment    -0.0197  -0.020  -0.011  -0.010
  [1994 Apr. ~ 1997 Mar.]    (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.072)
6. `97 amendment implemented    -0.1106  -0.111  -0.093  -0.092
  [1997 Apr. ~ 1998 Dec.]    (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)
Control variables 
Age   -0.0504*  -0.0516*  -0.051*  -0.053*  -0.053
 (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)
Age squared  0.0005  0.0005  0.001  0.001  0.001
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Inverse of parent size  19.0223***  19.103***  18.143***  18.049***  17.122***
 (1.401)  (1.389)  (1.446)  (1.381)  (1.442) 
Industry growth rate  -0.1428  -0.230  -0.241  -0.116  -0.125 
 (0.157)  (0.168)  (0.169)  (0.172)  (0.172) 
Industry GDP deﬂ  ator  0.0013  -0.0004  0.000  0.002  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Regime 2 × parent size       7.430**    2.784 
       (2.924)    (3.186) 
Incentive measure         5.749***  5.736***
         (0.642)  (0.638) 
Regime 2 × incentive measure         -0.149  -11.382***
         (0.665)  (4.280) 
R.2 × incentive × p. size          107.255***
         (39.779)
Own Industry  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Parent Industry  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Incorporation Month  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Region   YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
N 7527  7527  7527  7527  7527 
LL 4553.09  4539.123  4534.7672  4485.6489  4477.5055
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are heteroskedasticity consistent and are corrected 
for clustering at the group level. ***,**, * denotes the signiﬁ  cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively. 
For presentation purposes, coefﬁ  cients on dummy variables (two-digit industry, parent's industry, month of 
incorporation, location of the head quarters) and a constant term are not presented. 3 observations in the 
mining industry are not used in the analysis because the industry dummy predicts Y perfectly.24
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July 1988 through March 1991 were due to tax avoidance.45 While the rest of regime 
dummies are not signiﬁ  cantly different from zero, the decrease from the second regime 
to the last regime is signiﬁ  cant, suggesting that the amendments to the simpliﬁ  ed scheme 
successfully reduced tax incentives. Thus coefﬁ  cients of the regime dummies show a pat-
tern consistent with that implied by tax incentives.
Transition process
One explanation for the decline that occurs after the second regime is that corporations 
conducted less corporate splitting in response to the announcement of the VAT amend-
ment of 1991, but there is an alternative explanation. Suppose a corporation consists of   
n   divisions that differ in terms of costs of separate incorporation. Given tax incentives, 
business segments that are least costly to be divided will be the ﬁ  rst to be separated. After 
an initial surge of corporate splitting, we would expect a natural subsiding in corporate 
splitting activity as it is costly to separate remaining segments. To distinguish between 
these explanations, the transition process is examined by dividing the ﬁ  rst and second 
regimes into eight sub-regimes. If the announcement effect caused the decline, we do 
not expect to observe a decline during the second regime.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows that the decline had already started during August-No-
vember 1990, favouring the explanation based on a natural reduction.46 One may point 
out that the preliminary idea about the amendment was publicised on August 8, 1990 
and argue that an expectation of the imminent policy change caused the decline. How-
ever, it does not seem plausible to think that the effect of the tax, which reached 11.6 
per cent at its peak, would have continued without the policy change. Another possible 
explanation for the decline is a new regulation on the capital requirement for new corpora-
tions. Under the minimum capital requirement, which was enacted in April 1990, newly 
founded joint-stock corporations had to have paid-in capital of at least 10 million yen. 
Such a change would raise a hurdle in founding a new corporation.47 This explanation, 
however, seems unconvincing since there was a grace period for existing companies, which 
were not required to increase capital until the end of March 1996. As the requirement 
was not immediately applicable to companies founded before April 1991, when the law 
went into effect, the cost of founding a company would have been unaffected until then. 
Therefore, the change in the commercial law does not explain the decline that occurs 
during 1990, and it is the natural decline that best explains this pattern. In conjunction 
with the study by Scholes and Wolfson (1990) that ﬁ  nds ﬁ  rms respond quickly to tax 
incentives, our examination suggests tax-motivated structural change occurs within one 
to two years after the creation of tax incentives.25
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Examination of sub-samples
Thus far, the identiﬁ  cation strategy relied on the variation in incentives across tax regimes. 
The key assumption being that in the absence of tax changes, the relative propensity to 
found small corporations remains constant after controlling for subsidiary characteristics and 
for business climates. To provide a validity check for our approach, we tried incorporating 
cross-section variation in the analysis by considering two observable characteristics that 
Figure 6: Marginal effects of tax regimes26
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are likely to inﬂ  uence the decision to avoid tax, parent size and the level of value-added, 
for the following reasons. First, for a given corporate splitting, the relative size of tax 
beneﬁ  ts to group proﬁ  t is greater when a parent company is small.48 Second, tax beneﬁ  t 
(1) is a weakly increasing function of the level of value-added ratio  o ^h . If tax affected 
ﬁ  rm behaviour, then, we would expect an increase in the likelihood of small parents to 
establish a small corporation conducting high value-added businesses.
In testing these conjectures, the main difﬁ  culty was the lack of appropriate infor-
mation on value added at individual entity level. The main data does not contain any 
information on value added so we instead used matching information from the annual 
estimates of the value-added ratio by 2-digit SIC industry and by paid-in capital in the 
Financial Statement Statistics of Corporations. This data source allows us to incorporate 
industry-size variations in the analysis but measurement errors are expected to arise if a 
sample corporation is not representative of its respective industry-size cell and because 
of a deﬁ  nitional issue.49 Nevertheless, since on average the standard value-added ratio 
should be correlated with the level of incentives, we use this data to operationalise the 
further examination. 
 First, the sample is divided by median parent size and by median incentive measure 
and the base model is ﬁ  t to them. Table 8 shows the coefﬁ  cient estimates. Comparing the 
sub-samples by parent size, none of the coefﬁ  cients of tax regime dummies are signiﬁ  -
cantly different from zero in the sub-sample with large parents but some are signiﬁ  cant 
in the small parent sub-sample, strongly suggesting small groups responded actively to 
the tax incentives as conjectured. Turning to the sub-samples classiﬁ  ed by tax incentives, 
we ﬁ  nd somewhat mixed results. While the coefﬁ  cient of the tax regime after the VAT 
introduction is not signiﬁ  cant for the low incentive sub-sample but signiﬁ  cant for high 
incentive sub-sample, the point estimate on the former is positive and is of a moderate 
size. Moreover, there are signiﬁ  cant reductions after the announcement of the second 
amendment, indicating some non-tax factor might be at work due to the difﬁ  culty in 
measuring the level of incentives.
Second, we conducted interaction analysis to see if the differences in coefﬁ  cients 
across sub-samples are statistically signiﬁ  cant. We focused on the tax regime after the VAT 
introduction since the analysis so far suggests that much of the response occurred then. 
To implement, the second regime dummy is interacted with the parent size, the incen-
tive measure, and then with both variables. Since the parent size is deﬁ  ned as the inverse 
of the log of parent paid-in capital, smaller parents are associated with higher values of 
this variable. This means if the response of small parents is signiﬁ  cant, the interaction 
term with the regime dummy will be positive and signiﬁ  cant. The incentive measure is 
deﬁ  ned as  , ii 1989 - oo t ^h  where  , i 1989 o t  is the presumed rate of the value-added ratio for i's 27
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industry as deﬁ  ned in the 1989 tax law.50 The 1989 law is used to control for any system-
atic relationship between the incentive measure and the size to isolate the effect of the 
1989 institution. If the response is greater in the high incentive industry, the coefﬁ  cient 
of the interaction term will be positive and signiﬁ  cant. Finally, if there is a high response 
among small parents to set up high value-added subsidiaries, the triple interaction term 
of the second regime, parent size and incentive measure will be positive and signiﬁ  cant. 
The results from each examination are shown in Column 3-5 in Table 7. They indicate 
a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence for small parents but not for incentive measure on average. The 
result does indicate a signiﬁ  cant increase in the propensity for small parents to found 
Table 8: Further examination by subsampling
Sub-sampling by parent size            Sub-sampling by tax incentives
  LARGE  SMALL  High Incentive  Low incentive
Tax regimes dummies
1. Expect the '89 reform  0.013  0.104  0.166  -0.040  
[1988 Jul. ~ 1989 Mar.]  (0.103)  (0.122)  (0.107)  (0.119) 
2. Reform Implemented  0.043  0.305***  0.234**  0.135 
  [1989 Apr. ~ 1991 Mar.]  (0.100)  (0.086)  (0.095)  (0.086) 
3. Expect the `91 amendment  -0.136  0.284**  0.268  0.008 
  [1991 Apr. ~ 1991 Sep.]  (0.179)  (0.134)  (0.193)  (0.126) 
4. `91 amendment implemented  0.121  0.047  0.182  -0.109 
  [1991 Oct. ~ 1994 Mar.]  (0.123)  (0.102)  (0.115)  (0.108) 
5. Expect the '97 amendment  -0.020  0.025  0.056  -0.180  *
  [1994 Apr. ~ 1997 Mar.]  (0.109)  (0.094)  (0.102)  (0.101) 
6. `97 amendment implemented  -0.031  -0.151  0.099  -0.499***
  [1997 Apr. ~ 1998 Dec.]  (0.117)  (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.124) 
          
Control variables
Age   -0.067  -0.047  -0.080*  -0.019 
 (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.042) 
Age squared  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Inverse of parent size  34.913***  13.909***  18.803***  18.661***
 (4.690)  (2.174)  (1.933)  (1.699) 
Industry growth rate  -0.037  -0.373  -0.197  -0.716***
 (0.235)  (0.257)  (0.282)  (0.243) 
Industry GDP deﬂ  ator  0.000  0.000  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Own Industry  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Parent Industry  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Incorporation Month  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Region   YES  YES  YES  YES 
N 3726  3772  3747  3762 
LL 2153.1  2275.5  2256.9  2139.2 
Mean of dependent variable  0.391  0.573  0.607  0.357 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are heteroskedasticity consistent and are 
corrected for clustering at the group level. ***,**, * denotes the signiﬁ  cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level 
respectively.28
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high-value added subsidiaries as shown by the coefﬁ  cient of the triple interaction term. 
Thus further examinations lend support to the interpretation that the results we ﬁ  nd are 
caused by the tax incentives.
Estimation of Tax Beneﬁ  ts
In understanding the consequence of tax-motivated reorganizations, it is of interest to 
know the scale of beneﬁ  ts that arises from corporate splitting, not only because the tax 
beneﬁ  t is a loss of revenue to government, but because it provides an upper bound for the 
efﬁ  ciency loss to ﬁ  rms. A rational ﬁ  rm would not maintain a separate legal entity if costs, 
which may include the exacerbation of the principal-agent problem, exceed monetary gains. 
Previous studies have estimated the total amount of tax beneﬁ  t in the economy, without 
making any distinction between the windfall gains to qualifying corporations (those that 
are already in existence or are founded for non-tax reasons) and the tax-avoidance gains. 
This section estimates tax beneﬁ  ts in the sample, distinguishing between windfall gains 
and tax-avoidance gains, and extrapolates to the population.
Methodology
The sample is based on the ACD survey conducted during the fall of 1991 asking FY1990 
information. The year is chosen to assess the revenue drain prior to the amendment of 
October 1991. The sample consists of 15,230 observations with valid information on 
current sales and past sales matched from the 1989 survey. Past sales are necessary in 
classifying whether a corporation qualiﬁ  es for preferential treatment, since the tax status 
is determined on the basis of the amount of sales two years prior to the current year.51 
The total amount of tax beneﬁ  t is computed as the sum of tax beneﬁ  ts accruing to sample 
corporations deemed to qualify on the basis of past sales, taking into account three types of 
special treatment; the simpliﬁ  ed scheme, exemption and the phasing out of exemption.
Since tax avoidance is not observable, the parametric model is necessary to assess 
its revenue consequence. A simple approach is to apportion the total tax beneﬁ  ts on the 
basis of the ﬁ  nding that attributes 10.7 per cent of corporate founding over July 1988 
through March 1991 to tax avoidance. Since the result from this approach is aggregated 
over all industries and sizes, in an alternative approach, we utilise the entity-level informa-
tion to obtain ﬁ  ner estimates. Using the coefﬁ  cients of the interaction model (Column 5, 
Table 7), we predicted the size of corporation (i.e. greater than 500 million yen or not) 
on the basis of observables excluding the regime coefﬁ  cients and the interaction terms. 
We classiﬁ  ed as tax motivated newly founded corporations that are predicted to be large 
but are in fact small. An amount of 12.7 per cent of foundings is tax-motivated under 29
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this approach, so the two approaches are largely comparable. This approach further al-
lows us to account for the effect of splitting on divesting corporations. As the anecdotal 
example shows, the tax beneﬁ  ts accrue to a divesting corporation if it remains small as a 
result of splitting. The divesting corporations are identiﬁ  ed through matching address 
with tax-motivated corporations.
Three considerations are important in interpreting this exercise. First, the sample is 
based on groups headed by large corporations. Our analysis showed that there is active tax 
avoidance among smaller groups, but the vast majority of corporations in the population is 
unafﬁ  liated with other companies. Thus the direction of bias is ambiguous in this respect. 
Second, it is difﬁ  cult to account for the amount of tax beneﬁ  ts recaptured by the authority 
through the corporate income tax as discussed above, and here, we report the tax beneﬁ  t 
ﬁ  gure without making an adjustment for the income tax. Third, as already discussed, the 
information on value-added is based on the population average that does not incorporate 
investment expense, and this is likely to result in overestimation. Overall, the results from 
these exercises should be viewed as an upper bound for the tax revenue loss.52
Results and Interpretation
Table 9 summarises the tax beneﬁ  ts to the population of corporations in Japan, excluding 
the ﬁ  nancial sector, extrapolated from the sample estimate using weights based on the 
number of corporations at each industry-size cell. The total tax beneﬁ  t in the economy 
is 669 billion yen ($4.5 billion) in 1990. This constitutes 14.5 per cent of the total VAT 
receipt, meaning 14.5 yen in 100 yen of tax receipts was channeled from consumers to 
producers. The amount is more than three times the government expenditure on small and 
medium sized enterprise in the general account of 1990 (194 billion yen). As 87 per cent 
of the total beneﬁ  ts accrued to corporations in the smallest size category, the tax beneﬁ  ts 
were a substantial subsidy in disguise to small and medium sized enterprises, including 
subsidiaries of large parents. The beneﬁ  ts accrued mostly to the small manufacturing cor-
porations as a group, in part due to the prominence of the sector in the economy, but it is 
the transportation industry that beneﬁ  ted the most in terms of per company beneﬁ  ts. The 
estimate is higher than those from the previous study by the Ministry of Finance (¥480 
billion) and by Doi (¥560 billion), reﬂ  ecting the relatively accurate classiﬁ  cation method 
but also due to the fact that it does not account for investment expenditure.53
Under the simple approach, 2.7 per cent of the total tax beneﬁ  t arises from the tax 
motive, having a 95 per cent conﬁ  dence interval of 0.3 to 5.9 per cent. The alternative 
approach similarly attributes 3.4 per cent to the tax motive, 13.3 per cent of which is due 
to having a divesting body qualify for special treatment. In terms of absolute value, tax 30
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avoidance caused a revenue drain of 22 billion yen ($146 million). Thus, the tax moti-
vated gains are small relative to the windfall gains, making up about 0.5 per cent of the 
total tax receipt. Most interestingly, a comparison by industry reveals that 23 per cent of 
tax beneﬁ  ts to transportation subsidiaries was attributable to tax motives. It appears that 
tax avoidance was widespread amongst trucking companies, but a comparison by parent 
industry shows that it is not necessarily the case. It is the manufacturing parents which 
have the highest fraction of tax beneﬁ  ts attributable to tax motives (5.8 per cent), fol-
lowed by transportation, retail, and construction. This indicates that a rather broad range 
of parent companies split business segments undertaking transportation-related activities 
and that there are relatively low costs of splitting transportation segments.
Table 9: Tax beneﬁ  ts extrapolated to the population (in millions of yen)
     Corporate size (paid-in capital, yen)
      
Industry  [0, 10)  [10m, 100m)  [100m, 1b)   [1b, )  All  Parent's industry
Manufacturing 192,136  13,585  810  3    206,535 0.058 
 (0.002)  (0.034)  (0.014)  (0.000)    (0.004)
Agri., Forestry,  3,697  409  5  0    4,110   0.000 
Fishery (0.000)  (0.029)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.003) 
Mining 0  636  0  1    638  0.000
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000) 
Construction 107,100  1,656 254 0    109,009  0.016
 (0.015)  (0.058)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.016)   
Electricity and Gas  8  8  56  2    74  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)   
Communication 82  50  76  0   209  0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.432)    (0.015)   
Transportation 61,276  15,018  181  9  76,483  0.021 
 (0.284)  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.230)   
Wholesale 16,778 1,527  6  0 18,310  0.005 
 (0.037)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.035)   
Retail 26,797  4,711  184  0  31,692  0.018 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.004) 
Real estate  83,579  23,600  2,799  21  109,999  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.206)  (0.003)   
Services 88,780  21,991  1,291  378  112,439  0.000 
 (0.006)  (0.030)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.010)   
Total 580,232  83,190  5,661  415  669,499  0.036
 (0.036)  (0.021)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.034)
Note: The amount of tax beneﬁ  ts in millions of yen. The fractions of tax beneﬁ  ts arising from tax-motivated 
splitting are shown in parentheses. The last column shows the fraction of tax beneﬁ  ts by parent's industry. 
The proportion for "Total" in the last two columns does not match because the subsidiaries of ﬁ  nancial 




In summary, this paper documented the effects of a tax threshold on ﬁ  rm behaviour in the 
context of the Japanese VAT. A semi-parametric comparison of size distributions revealed 
a visible impact of the threshold following the tax reform of 1989, indicating a prevalence 
of tax avoidance of unspeciﬁ  ed form. Further examination narrowed down the avoidance 
strategy as follows. First, corporate splitting was a relevant and widespread method. In 
our sample of group corporations, the threshold induced the founding of 10.7 to 12.7 
per cent of new corporations over July 1988 to March 1991. Second, ﬁ  rms responded 
quickly and the response peaked in 8 to 16 months after the implementation of the law. 
Third, a common method seems to have involved separately incorporating a transportation 
segment, suggesting little organizational disadvantages to such a transaction. The overall 
impact of tax-motivated splitting on the revenue performance of VAT was, however, rather 
modest, causing a drain of 0.5 per cent of total VAT receipt in 1990, due to the fact that 
gains to each ﬁ  rm were small. The ﬁ  rst approximation of the efﬁ  ciency loss, which is half 
the revenue loss, implied by this study is 11 billion yen ($73 million).
Overall, to the extent that the proﬁ  t motive dominates decisions of ﬁ  rms operating 
in different countries, this study suggests masquerading behaviour may be commonplace 
in tax as well as regulatory systems in various countries around the world, especially since 
the results indicate that a modest beneﬁ  t induces behavioural changes at a large scale. 
Nonetheless, this study focused on an environment where anti-avoidance clauses are 
sufﬁ  ciently loose due to the political reason. It would be interesting to explore the role 
of anti-avoidance provisions and their enforcement in further studies. Lastly, a threshold 
is a common component in a host of public policies that favour small over large ﬁ  rms. 
In this author's opinion, the masquerading by ﬁ  rms is likely to be left undocumented in 
variety of other settings.
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Notes
1   For example, Title I of the Americans with Disability Act prohibits discrimination against persons with 
disabilities in employment by businesses having 15 or more employees. In a small business support program 
in the UK analysed by Wren and Storey (2002), the eligibility requirement is no more than 500 employees. 
Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, small oil reﬁ  ners below a set production capacity 
were not subjected to price controls (Viscusi et al. 2001). Under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment, 
the federal government mandated that states formulate a program applicable to organisations that own or 
operate more than 10 vehicles in designated areas (Callan and Thomas 2004).
2   Similarly, after the Second World War, the US banks sought to overcome the restriction on interstate 
banking by separately chartering banks in different states (Matasar and Heiney 2002).
3   More than 120 countries adopt VAT and thresholds are incorporated in the majority of them. As for the 
OECD nations with a VAT, 84 per cent adopt a threshold. See Ebrill et al. (2001) for an international 
summary.
4   As is well known in the VAT literature, there is a disadvantage in not registering to ﬁ  le a VAT under the 
invoice system, which is adopted in most counties. Japan uses the account system instead. Under the invoice 
system, registered ﬁ  rms, in general, have incentives to avoid purchasing from exempt ﬁ  rms, because non-
registered ﬁ  rms are not allowed to issue invoices that registered ﬁ  rms use to obtain tax credits. However, 
there is no such concern for ﬁ  rms that deal with ﬁ  nal consumers, thus a VAT exemption would still be 
attractive in retail and service sectors.
5   Kankei Kaisha Data, also published in print as Nihon no Kigyo Gurupu by Toyo Keizai Co. Westney (1996) 
provides discussion on corporate groups, sometimes referred to as a vertical keiretsu or capital keiretsu.
6   This paper uses the average dollar-yen exchange rate of 1990 and calculates one dollar to be one hundred 
and ﬁ  fty yen.
7   Goolsbee and Maydew (2002) is similar to this study in focusing on divisive operations. Other studies on 
tax avoidance by ﬁ  rms include income shifting by multi-national corporations (Grubert and Mutti 1991; 
Hines and Rice, 1994; Grubert and Slemrod 1998) and the choice of organizational form (Gordon and 
MacKie-Mason 1990, 1994, 1997).
8   Ebrill et al. (2001, p121) discuss the case of a VAT threshold. Scholes et al. (2002) discuss the effect of 
taxes on organisational structure in general.
9   Another example is the effects of taxes on merger and acquisition activities, where the evidence in the 
literature is mixed (for example, Scholes and Wolfson 1990; Auerbach and Reishus 1988).
10   See also Pedone (1981).
11   Khanna and Yafeh (2005) provide a recent synthesis of international studies on business groups. See Yafeh 
(2000) for a review of studies on Japanese business groups and Granovetter (1995) for a review of sociology 
studies.
12   See Homma and Atoda (1989) for a discussion on small business treatment. Ishi (2001) offers a comprehensive 
overview of the Japanese VAT. Kaizuka (1992) provides a broad overview of the historical backgrounds 
of the 1989 reform. Discussions by Noguchi (1992) and Hatta (1992) illustrate the main political issues 
from opposing perspectives. Kishi (1998) provides a narrative account of the reform.
13   Automobiles were taxed at 6 per cent as a transition measure from the replaced indirect tax on automobiles, 
which was 23 per cent.
14   The LDP efforts to introduce a VAT were met with strong oppositions; there had been two failed attempts 
in 1979 and in 1987, and 71 per cent of public was against the tax bill in a poll conducted by Yomiuri 
Shimbun on 23 February 1989 (Ishi 2001, p280). To win support from small businesses in passing a VAT 
bill, including from the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI), a leading opposition group 
in the 1987 attempt, the LDP engaged in a series of dialogue with its business constituent. During April 
1988, the LDP special committee on tax reform conducted hearings involving 338 organisations, including 
business associations and LDP local branches (Kishi 1998, p137). The tax bill that ﬁ  nally passed included 
concessions that JCCI expressed support for.
15   The Japanese VAT initially had two categories for the presumed rate of value-added. All industries, except 
the wholesale industry, had the rate of 80 per cent; the rate for the wholesale industry was 90 per cent.
16   See Ishi (2001 p282).
17   For simplicity, investments are ignored in this discussion.
18   In April 2004, the simpliﬁ  ed scheme threshold was reduced further to 50 million yen.
19   There are various types of grouping of companies that exist for different reasons. A corporate group in 
this study referred to a group of corporations afﬁ  liated though the ownership of capital and is sometimes 
referred to as a capital keiretsu (see Westney 1998). A distinction should be from a horizontal keiretsu, 
which refers to a group centered on the main bank system.
20   It is assumed, for the illustration purposes, that the taxable sales in the current year determine the tax 
status. Although the tax status in year t is determined by level of sales in t-2 in practice, the tax treatment 33
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is still discontinuous at the threshold. Reinterpreting the sales on the x-axis to be constant annual sales 
generated over a ﬁ  xed period of time, the hidden subsidy in present value terms would give the exact same 
shape.
21   This example is reported by a popular centre-left newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, April 24 (evening edition), 
1989.
22   It is reported that in setting up a new sports merchandise shop in a new location, the tax motive inﬂ  uenced 
the company's decision to set up a legally separate corporation, rather than a branch.
23   The rate is the effective tax rate on corporate income as at 1990 and includes corporate income tax, 
enterprise tax, and corporate resident tax.
24   One component of the transaction costs is the registration license tax, which is 7 mills of the paid-in capital 
with the minimum of 150,000 yen for founding of joint stock corporations.
25   If divested companies were founded by investment in kind and its shares were closely held by related parties, 
a divested company is aggregated with the parent for the purpose of the VAT. Even so, if a subsidiary is 
classiﬁ  ed in a different two-digit industry from its parent, it is taxed separately in subsequent years (Yamamoto 
1996).
26   Establishing a company by investment in kind is a cumbersome method that involves assessment of assets 
by a third party, and it lacks popularity (Niiyama 2001, p56).
27   This case was identiﬁ  ed while estimating the tax beneﬁ  ts.
28   According to the FY2002 ﬁ  nancial report ﬁ  led with the Stock and Exchange Commission, his son was 
the executive director of the parent company (http://info.edinet.go.jp/InfoDisclosure/alphabet/index.
jsp). The large number of subsidiaries is in part due to this ﬁ  rm's national network of parcel delivery.
29   The names of subsidiaries are translated by this author since their ofﬁ  cial English names could not be 
obtained.
30   As already noted, there are provisions against tax-motivated division, and in determining the tax status, the 
divested company may be counted as part of a divesting company, under certain form of divisions. Without 
more information on the circumstances, it is not possible to ascertain that the divestiture was successfully 
reduced the tax liability. However, in this particular case, it seems fair to say that the two companies were 
taxed separately. This is because the industry classiﬁ  cation of CJOS is different from that of DI, and the 
voting stock held within the group is less than 50 per cent.
31   The spike in 1996 is caused the conversions of small joint-stock corporations to limited-liability corporations. 
It is a result of the change in the minimum capital requirement for joint-stock corporations.
32   In June 1988, the proposal for the preferential treatment of small companies was publicised, and JCCI, 
the leading opposition to the earlier LDP initiative, publicised its acceptance of the reform. Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, June 3 (evening edition), 1988.
33   See Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997) for a discussion on the bubble economy of the late 1980s.
34   The summary of the EEC is published at the website of the Statistics Bureau, Government of Japan 
(http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jigyou/2001/index2.htm).
35   The reform law was ﬁ  rst passed by the Lower House in November 1988, but the reform proposal, which 
eventually passed with minor amendments, became known to the public on June 15, 1988 (Ishi 2002, 
p276).  
36   Further details of the data are explained in Onji (2005).
37   In the study by DFL on wage distributions, it is assumed that wage structures do not depend on the 
underlying distribution of attributes, such as education levels. For instance, this assumption rules out the 
possibility that an increase in the supply of educated labour force reducing the return to education. 
38   In addition, the sales information from subsidiaries founded over 1989-90 samples is based on FY1992, 
that is to say, after the ﬁ  rst amendment that reduced the tax incentive. Re-optimization in the form of 
mergers and expansion would make these samples resemble the post-amendment samples.
39   Even when the data is available, there is a concern that the level of sales is affected by a shorter ﬁ  nancial 
year. For these reasons, the sample is restricted to the subsidiaries with at lease one year in operation at the 
beginning of the ﬁ  scal year. As a result, the youngest subsidiary in the sample is 24 months old, as of the 
end of the ﬁ  scal year.
40   The logit model yields a similar prediction and the results are not reported here.
41   Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 3 (evening edition), 1988; April 13, 1991; March 15, 1994. As discussed 
in the earlier footnote, the leading opposition group expressed support for the proposed plan in June 
1988. In March-April 1991, as a result of the Socialist Party's compromise in agreeing to amend the 
tax, the prospect of a change in October 1991 became imminent. The proposal for the amendment had 
been publicised in August 1990. In April 1994, the government announced a planned amendment to the 
preferential treatment.
42   In addition, a quadratic term for AGE is included to control for possible non-linearity in age. Quadratic 
controls for GROWTH and PRICE were included to check robustness, but they did not make a signiﬁ  cant 
change.
43   The model restricts the effects within a regime to be constant while allowing for cross-regime differences. 34
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An alternative is a ﬂ  exible model that allows for within-regime differences. For example, a model with an 
indicator for each founding month. We present the results from the parsimonious model since the latter 
model is informative about within regime variation but estimates are much volatile. We conducted a test 
of restriction by comparing the base model with the one with 167 dummy variables for each founding 
month. Other than the regime dummies, both models have the same speciﬁ  cation and do not include the 
control for founding month to avoid collinearity. A likelihood ratio test did not reject the hypothesis that 
two models are the same at 10 per cent level of signiﬁ  cance.
44   It is conventional to evaluate the marginal effects at the means of regressors, and we followed the convention 
to compute the values presented in the ﬁ  gure. An alternative way is to take an average of marginal effects 
evaluated at each data point. This alternative method produces conservative estimates; the absolute value 
of each estimate is 14 per cent lower than that estimated from the conventional method.
45   The computation is based on the assumption that the ratio of the number of small to large new corporations 
remains at pre-expectation level.
46   One interesting pattern in the ﬁ  gure is the dip just before the implementation. The level is not signiﬁ  cantly 
different from zero, but it may be reﬂ  ecting the incentive to delay the founding of a subsidiary. Newly 
founded entities are exempted from the VAT for their ﬁ  rst two years of operation. So an entity, which 
was initially scheduled to open in March, could extend the exempted period by a month, by delaying 
registration to April. The pattern is consistent with an explanation that there were birthday shiftings of 
smaller companies.
47   This commercial law reform was in part a policy response to sole proprietors incorporating their business 
for tax purposes, according to the Justice Department (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 3, 1990, p7).
48   One might be concerned that the paid-in capital of the parent will fall due to spin-offs. I tried replacing 
PSIZE with an alternative control for a group size, which is deﬁ  ned to be the sum of paid-in capital from 
group companies, but the results were not affected.
49   Given the consumption-type VAT in Japan, buyers receive full credit for tax paid on capital equipment 
provided that they are ﬁ  ling an ordinary return. Filers of the simpliﬁ  ed return forgo this beneﬁ  t, resulting 
in a higher effective tax payment in a year where large investments are made. Thus for ⅴ to measure the 
level of incentives accurately, the value of inputs should include the total amount of investment outlay in 
a given year, rather than the amount of capital depreciation, unlike in the standard computation of value 
added.
50   Strictly speaking the incentive measure should be truncated below zero if  < oo t to account for the tax 
provision that allows companies to renounce the simpliﬁ  ed scheme. The results are not sensitive to this 
consideration.
51   Doi (1990) bases his classiﬁ  cation on current sales but this results in an underestimation of tax beneﬁ  ts due 
to company growth: Companies selling in excess of 500 million yen are eligible to ﬁ  le a simpliﬁ  ed return 
if their sales were below the threshold in the base year. My comparison of these different classiﬁ  cation 
methods indicates that the total beneﬁ  t is 34 per cent lower when current sales is used.
52   Further details on the estimation method are outlined in Onji (2005).
53   The estimate by Ministry of Finance is as reproduced in Homma and Atoda (1989). Doi (1990) does not 
report the total tax beneﬁ  ts and the ﬁ  gure here is based on the average tax beneﬁ  ts and the approximate 
sample size in his paper. 
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